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EXTRADITION!
The great expansion in recent times of the system of
extradition is an evidence of the gradual recognition by
nations, in their intercourse with one another, of common
sense as a controlling principle. Extradition imports, simply,
the enforcement of the law. Formerly, each State seemed to
endeavor so far as possible to defeat that end, by making
itself a refuge for offenders against the laws of other States.
Domestic criminals were prosecuted and punished. Foreign
criminals were regarded as objects of peculiar favor, and were
not given up except in the presence of superior force. What
was called the right of asylum was carefully guarded.
In the last half century there has been a revolution in
opinion on this subject. In place of the idea of asylum as a
right belonging to the fugitive, there has been established the
right of the State either to extradite or to expel any offender
who comes within the jurisdiction. This right is recognized
in the laws of all civilized States, and in none more fully than
in those of the United States.
The change in opinion on the subject of extradition, though
'Read at the World's Congress of Jurisprudence and Law Reform, at
Chicago, August 17, 1893.
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it has been rapid, has been the result, and the necessary
result, of modem developments. The present century has
been characterized by a wonderful improvement in facilities of
travel and by vast movements of population. And as flight
from justice has become more easy and more frequent, the
necessity to check it has become more apparent.
As the practice of surrendering fugitives from justice has
been extended, the distrust which was formerly felt among
nations in respect to the treatment which a surrendered
criminal might receive has gradually disappeared. Even
where treaties of extradition existed, the prejudice against
them formerly was so great as to obstruct their execution.
The treaty between France and Great Britain of February 13,
1843, never was executed, though it was little more than a
rescript of Article 20 of the Treaty of Amiens, between
France, Spain, Holland and Great Britain, signed March 2,
1802. In 1852 another convention of extradition was con-
cluded between France and Great Britain, but it never went
into effect. Between the years 1854 and .1858 France made
seven demands under this treaty, but in" no case was a war-
rant of extradition granted, and further demands were aban-
doned. At the present day there exists between the two
countries a comprehensive treaty of extradition, under which
fugitive criminals, including that new species of social and poli-
tical reformer, called the anarchist, are fully delivered up.
The first extradition treaty of the United States was em-
bodied in the 27 th Article of the treaty with Great Britain
of 1794, commonly called the Jay Treaty. It included only
murder and forgery, and, being limited in duration to a period
of twelve years from the date of the exchange of ratifications,
expired in 1807. The surrender under its provisions of one
Robbins, an alleged American citizen, on the order of Presi-
dent John Adams, created great popular excitement and
materially contributed to the overthrow of his administration.
The next extradition treaty of the United States may be
found in the 9 th Article of the convention with Great Britain
of August 9, 1842, known as the Webster-Ashburton Treaty.
It comprised only the offences of murder, assault with intent
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to commit murder, piracy, arson, robbery, forgery, and the
utterance of forged paper; but it awoke violent opposition in
the United States, and on January 30, 1844, Mr. Benton
offered in the Senate a resolution for its immediate termina-
tion. This resolution was not adopted. On July 15, 1889,
there was concluded between the United States and Great
Britain a comprehensive treaty of extradition, by which many
offences were added to the list comprised in the treaty of
1842, and by which the relations between the United States
and Great Britain, in respect to extradition, were made more
satisfactory than those between the United States and any
,other power.
The question whether it is the duty of a nation to deliver up
fugitives from justice in the absence of an express conven-
tional obligation, has generally been answered in the negative,
though publicists of great eminence have maintained that
such a duty exists. In the case of Washburn,1 in 1819,
Chancellor Kent declared that it was "the law and usage of
nations, resting on the plainest principles of justice and public
utility, to deliver up offenders charged with felony and other
high crimes, and fleeing from the country in which the crime
was committed, into a foreign and friendly jurisdiction."
In his Commentaries 2 he is even more explicit. "It is
declared," he says, "by some of the most distinguished public
jurists that every State is bound to deny an asylum to crimi-
nals, and, upon application and due examination of the case,
to surrender the fugitive to the foreign State where the crime
was committed. The language of those authorities is clear
and explicit, and the law and usage of nations, as declared by
them, rest on the plainest principles of justice. It is the duty
of the government to surrender up fugitives upon demand,
after the civil magistrates shall have ascertained the existence
of reasonable grounds for the charge, and sufficient to put
the accused upon his trial."
But, assuming that a nation is not obliged, in the absence of
a treaty, to deliver up fugitives from justice on demand, it by
1Johns. Ch. IO5, 107.2 Vol. I., P. 37.
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no means follows that governments are free from all obligation.
in such cases. "If," says Billot, "the State upon which the-
demand is made is not bound, in strict right, to authorize the
extradition requested, it neverthelesss is not free from all duty..
The obligation rests upon it, which is incumbent upon every
well-organized society, not to permit the moral law to be
violated with impunity."' A nation which refused to sur-
render fugitives from justice and declined to enter into,
treaties on the subject, would become an object of general'
aversion, and would be the recipient of international complaints.
Lord Campbell, once declared in the House of Lords that "he
should like to see some general law enacted, and held binding
on all States, that each should surrender to the demand of the
other all persons charged with serious offences, except politi-
cal."' In 1878 the Royal Commission appointed to consider
the question of amending the British extradition acts, recom-
mended that authority be conferred by act of Parliament upon
the government to surrender fugitives from justice without
reference to the treaties.
Several years ago an eminent Canadian judge expressed a
desire, without regard to prejudices on economic questions,
for "free trade" in criminals between Canada and the United
States 3 In 1889 the Parliament of Canada passed an act
which provides for the surrender of fugitive criminals for any
of a long list of crimes, without reference to the question
whether a treaty exists with the demanding government, or
whether, if a treaty does exist, the crime charged is included
in it. The act, however, is not generally and immediately
effective for purposes of extradition, since it is not to come
into force with respect to fugitive offenders from any foreign
State, until it shall have been declared by proclamation of the
Governor-General to be in force and effect as regards such
State, from and after a day to be named in the proclamation.
This clause makes the execution of the act rest in the discretion
of the Governor-General, and if he sees fit to require a promise
I Trait6 de l'extradition, p. 32.
2 6o Hansard, 325 ; Feb. 14, 1842.
3 Mr. Justice Osler, In re Parker, 9 P. R. 332, 335.
EXTRADITION.
of reciprocity as a condition of such execution, the act amounts
to nothing more than a standing offer to conclude arrange-
ments for the reciprocal surrender of persons charged with
certain specified offences.
On December 13, 1875, Mr. Morrill, of Vermont, offered in
the Senate of the United States, a resolution to instruct the
Committee on Foreign Relations to "inquire into the expedi-
ency of providing, by general law, for the extradition of
fugitives from justice upon the proper application and proof by
the governments from whence they may have escaped, and
also as to the projriety of refusing asylum to fugitive criminals,
and removing them from the country." The resolution was
considered by unanimous consent and agreed to, but the
Committee failed to make any report.
It is, however, worthy of notice that the immigration laws
of the United States require the return to the country from
which they came, of all non-political convicts. Though this
measure is not in the nature of an extradition treaty, the
-execution of which another government may require, its full
significance, as affecting the subject of extradition, has, perhaps,
hardly been appreciated. With such a provision in our
statutes, it is difficult to set a limit to the extent to which the
system of extradition may logically be carried. It is obvious
that the mere fact of conviction does not render a man an
undesirable immigrant, nor does successful flight from prosecu-
tion work a magical cure of evil propensities. The law is
based on the principle that it does not comport with the safety
of the State or of society in general to afford a refuge to
criminals and shield them from punishment; and this is the
basal principle of the system of extradition.
Not only has the number of extradition treaties been multi-
plied in recent times, but the scope of such treaties has been
greatly extended by the incorporation of offences, which were
formerly excluded. I refer especially to the inclusion of
crimes of fraud. In this respect, nations have simply recog-
nized the change, which, in the development of civilization,
has taken place in the relative importance of criminal offences.
As civilization develops and refinement of manners is culti-
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vated, crimes of fraud take the place of crimes of violence.
Embezzlement, swindling and breaches of trust take the place
of robbery and larceny; and, for the very reason that they
are committed secretly and without open breach of the peace,
and may thus be continued for a long time without detection,
they are more dangerous to social order and security than
simpler crimes, which, though accompanied with violence, are
more readily detected and more easily repressed. Every
week brings us news of fraud by which the credit of public
and private institutions is destroyed and ruin brought upon
helpless investors; of swindling transactions by which inno-
cent persons are reduced to poverty; and of breaches of
trust by which the fortunes of many are dissipated. Such
crimes are as dangerous as they are execrable, and call for the
most relentless prosecution and repression.
There has been a general disposition on the part of the
United States to include in extradition treaties crimes of vio-
lence and to exclude crimes of fraud; yet we find departures
from this rule with so little apparent reason as to suggest that
they are due to special and temporary causes rather than to a
settled purpose to admit offences that fall in the latter cate-
gory. Thus we find the offence of obtaining money or goods
by false pretences only in the treaties with Spain and the
Netherlands. This offence was included in the convention
with Great Britain of July 12, 1889, but was stricken out by
the Senate, although the offence of "receiving any money,
valuable security or other property, knowing the same to have
been embezzled, stolen or fraudulently obtained," was
permitted to stand. One objection made to the insertion of
the crime of obtaining money or goods by false pretences is
that it is liable to abuse, and in order to prove the validity of
the objection, resort is often had to cases that have occurred
in the rendition of fugitives from justice as between the States.
of the United States. This argument is not well-founded,
indeed is radically erroneous, for the reason that the methods.
of procedure in international cases are totally different from
those employed as between the States. Our treaties and stat-
utes provide for a judicial examination, in all international
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cases, of the question of the fugitive's probable guilt, and it
is provided that he shall be delivered up only on such evi-
dence as would warrant his commitment for trial in the place
where he may be found, if the offence had there been com-
mitted. If the judicial examination result in his commitment
for surrender, the President may disregard the finding and
refuse to make the delivery. In the interstate proceeding all
these safeguards are lacking. There is, and legally can be, no
examination into the question of the fugitive's guilt, either by
the courts or by the State executives. The question is not
whether there is sufficient evidence to lead one to believe that
the fugitive committed the crime, but whether he is charged
in the State from which he fled with having committed it.
The existence of such a charge is the basis of the demand,
and the duty to comply is immediate and absolute. It is,
therefore, clear that an abuse of the process of interstate
rendition, by making unfounded charges, affords no ground for
supposing that an attempt to commit a similar abuse in an
international case would be successful. The requirement and
examination of the evidence of criminality, in the latter case,
fundamentally distinguishes t from the former. The most
effective stipulation in any of the treaties of the United States,
touching crimes of fraud, is found in the convention with
Great Britain of July 12, 1889, which includes among the
extraditable crimes "fraud by a bailee, banker, agent, factor,
trustee, or director or member or officer of any company,
made criminal by the ;v of both countries."
In some of our treaties a limitation has been introduced,
where the offence relates to the unlawful obtaining or taking
of money or property, of requiring the object so taken to
have been of a certain amount or value. I am compelled to
think that such a limitation is from every point of view vicious
and indefensible. The amount or value of property which a
criminal may obtain is not determinative of the importance or
gravity of his offence. This is shown by the fact that our
statutes do not graduate penalties on any such basis. The
law is not so sympathetic with the criminal as to commiserate
and forgive him, because he may have been disappointed in
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what he gained by his crime. The law does not say that a
man may steal or embezzle any amount below fifty dollars,
with impunity. Lawmakers know that it would be altogether
absurd to make such a declaration. Yet, this is precisely
what some of our extradition treaties have been made to
say. In the Phelps-Rosebery treaty of June 25, 1886, which
was rejected by the Senate in February, 1889, it was provided
that embezzlement and larceny should be extraditable, when
of property of the value of fifty dollars, or ten pounds, and
upwards. In the treaty of July 15, 1889, that limitation was
utterly discarded, the offences of larceny and embezzlement
being included without any limitation whatever; nor was any
pecuniary limitation, touching any offence involving the
unlawful obtaining of property, admitted into the treaty.
When the treaty was transmitted to the Senate, for its advice
and consent to the exchange of ratifications, this aspect of
the negotiation was prominently presented and fully explained.
The treaty was approved without amendment in this regard.
Yet, we find that the obnoxious limitation has been reintro-
duced in the recent treaty with Sweden.
The sensible view of the matter seems to be that, where an
offence is of sufficient gravity to lead the contracting parties
to make it extraditable, it should be left for the government
within whose jurisdiction such offence has been committed to
say whether in the particular instance an application for
extradition should be made. Especially is this true in respect
to offenders who have taken refuge in the United States. The
expense and uncertainty of obtaining the extradition of such
offences has always been so great, that a foreign government
is not likely to take the risk of an application without good
reason for so doing.
For many years it was a controverted question in the
United States, and certainly an open question in England,
whether a person extradited for one offence might be tried for
another without having had an opportunity to return to the
jurisdiction of the government by which he was surrendered.
This question was answered in the negative by the British
Extradition Act of 1870, and by the Supreme Court of the
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United States in the case of William Rauscher in December,
1886.1 For many years prior to the decision in this case, we
had been inserting in our treaties a stipulation forbidding trial
for other than the extradition offence. The question as to
the right to try for another offence arose only under the
treaties, particularly that with Great Britain of 1842, in which
no rule was expressed; and -the decision in the Rauscher
case, which arose under that treaty, settled the law for all
cases not governed by a special conventional provision.
From the rule that a person may not, without an oppor-
tunity to return to the jurisdiction from which he was surren-
dered, be tried for an offence other than that for which he
was extradited, it does not necessarily follow that conviction
and sentence must be for that crime and no other. Thus if
the charge of crime for which the extradition was granted
includes within itself another crime, there appears to be no
reason why, upon a trial for the crime as charged, there may
not be a conviction of the lesser crime which it includes. This
exception would apply generally to those cases in which, by
reason of the principal charge including an offence of a lower
degree, an indictment is not held to be bad for duplicity.
Such would be the case of an indictment for murder, in which
the jury may disregard the higher charge and find a verdict of
manslaughter; or for burglary and stealing, in which, in the
failure of proof of breaking and entering, the jury may con-
vict of larceny; or or assault and battery, or assault with
intent to kill or ravish, or assault with intent to do other illegal
acts, in which the defendant may be convicted of assault
alone. But the trial must be for the extradition crime; and it
is only in a case where, upon a trial for that crime, conviction
may be had of another because included in it, that a conviction
of any other than the extradition crime would be admissible.
But it is more than questionable, whether the rule against
trial for any other than the extradition offence should be
adhered to among nations. Arising out of the anxiety of
governments to prevent perversion of the process of extra-
dition, especially for the purpose of trying fugitives for
I U. S. v. Rauscher, ri9 U. S. 4o7.
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political offences, experience has shown that a rigid adher-
ence to the rule often works a defeat of justice. The ways
in which such a result may occur are many. Thus, A.
is extradited on the charge of larceny of the goods of
B. It turns out that the goods belonged to B. and C. A. is
acquitted on the ground of variance between the indictment
and the evidence. This exhausts the extradition process and
the culprit is discharged. The same result might occur if A.
were surrendered on the charge of stealing the goods of B.,
who turns out to be a married woman. Or, if A. is surren-
dered for larceny, and it is shown on the trial that he took an
express package which had been placed in his hands to be
delivered to his master. In accordance with the common-law
principle, this would not be larceny, as the goods never were
in the master's hands. Thus A. would go free. Likewise if,.
being a carrier, he appropriated goods in his care without
breaking bulk. He is extradited for larceny and acquitted.
He cannot be tried for embezzlement, though it is clearly
proved. The same result would take place if, being surren-
dered for forgery, it should be shown that, as in the case
of a clerk in a bank, with discretionary powers, his offence
was only embezzlement. Other cases might be stated almost
without end. The trouble and expense of extradition have
been incurred and the culprit is discharged, though the very
evidence that gives him his freedom establishes his criminality.
In view of these facts, it may well be argued that the strict
rule against trial for other than the extradition offence should
be modified, so that the ends of justice may be secured. In
1877 Dr. von Bar, of the University of G6ttingen, the author
of the leading German work on private international law,
proposed, in an article in the Revue de Droit International, the
following rules: (I.) That an extradited person may be prose-
cuted for a punishable act committed by him prior to his
extradition, but not specified in the demand therefor, only if
the government from which his extradition was obtained gives
its consent expressly for the special case in question. (2.) That
this consent should not be refused, unless the new punishable
act constitutes a political offence, or a contravention of the
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laws of customs or impost. Consent should otherwise be given,
without regard to the degree of the penalty with which the
act is punishable, or to the fact whether the offence is found in
the number of those for which extradition may be demanded.1
Departures have been made from the rigid rule of restriction
in four of the extradition treaties of the United States. The
treaties with Spain and the Netherlands provide that the person
extradited shall not be tried for any crime or offence other
than that for which he was delivered up, unless such crime or
offence be one of those specified in the treaty as affording
ground for extradition. So far as the restriction of trial rests
on the desire to shield the fugitive from political prosecutions,
such a provision is insufficient. Tn this respect, it is less
favorable to the fugitive than the rules proposed by Dr. von
Bar, since it does not require the consent of the surrendering
government. On the other hand, it is illiberal to the govern-
ment whose laws have been violated in restricting the trial to
a treaty crime. The other treaties of the United States
containing special rules on this subject are those with Belgium
and Luxemburg. By the Belgian treaty it is provided that, for
crimes or offences committed previously to extradition, and not
enumerated in the convention, the fugitive shall not be tried
until he shall have been allowed a month to leave the country
after having been discharged from custody on the extradition
offence; but, for crimes or offenses committed previously to
his extradition (other than that for which extradition was
granted), and enumerated in the convention, it is provided, that
he shall not be tried without the consent of the surrendering
government. These provisions introduce the principle of
consent, but as it is confined to offences enumerated in the
convention, it is limitative of the rule as to trial for other than
the extradition offence laid down in the Spanish and Nether-
lands treaties. Evidently modelled on the provisions of the
treaty with Belgium are those in the treaty with Luxemburg,
of 1883, the year following the conclusion of the Belgian
treaty. The clauses, as to trial for offences not enumerated in
the convention, are precisely the same; but, in respect to the
R ev. de Droit Int. (1877), Vol. IX., pp. 5, 16.
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enumerated offences, other than that for which extradition was
granted, the Luxemburg treaty, instead of stipulating that the
fugitive shall not be tried therefor without the consent of the
government from whose jurisdiction he was taken, provides
that he may be tried and punished for such offences, adding,
however, that "notice of the purpose to so try him, with
specification of the offence charged," shall be given to the
surrendering government. These provisions appear to permit
trial for another offence without the previous obtainment of the
consent of that government, and the only restrictive provision,
apart from that respecting notice to the surrendering govern-
ment, is a stipulation that such government "may, if it think
proper, require the production of one of the documents men-
tioned in Article 7 " of the convention, which specifies the
documentary evidences which must accompany requisitions
for the surrender of fugitives charged with or convicted of the
commission of crime.
For my own part, I accept the rules proposed by Dr. von
Bar; but I would go a step further, and, besides permitting trial
for another offence with the consent of the surrendering govern-
ment, I would also permit it with the consent of the fugitive him-
self. It is true that the immunity of the extradited person grows
out of his extradition, and, as a question of right,'is interna-
tional rather than personal. It rests upon a contract between
the two governments, and not upon any agreement of either
of them with the individual. His wishes are disregarded
when he is seized and delivered up. It is to prevent him from
gaining exemption from punishment by flight that he is sur-
rendered. His immunity is within the control of the surren-
dering government, and he could not be permitted to set it
up, if that government should waive it. But the immunity
from trial, though within the control of the surrendering gov-
ernment, is, nevertheless, intended for the protection of the
accused. That government reserves it, in order that it may
not become a party to his oppression. It surrenders him to
be tried for the extradition crime and no other, in order that
its power over him may not be exercised to subject him to
prosecutions, which it cannot recognize, and is unwilling to
.-76o
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promote. While, therefore, the immunity may be inferred
from treaty, and by implication confirmed by domestic legis-
lation, it is designed for the fugitive's protection; and unless.
he is by some clear provision forbidden to waive it, or the
courts are in the same manner prohibited from accepting his
waiver, it seems to be an extreme view to hold that he has not
the right to forego his exemption. Such a course may be
manifestly for his advantage. He may desire without delay
to be tried on all the charges that are pending against him.
To say that in such case he may not be tried is unnecessarily
restrictive of his freedom. When within the jurisdiction of
the surrendering government, prior to his extradition, it was
within his power to return to the demanding State and stand
trial for all his offences. To say that he cannot exercise the
same right of election after his surrender, is to deny him the
freedom of action he possessed before his extradition.
Nor is this view inconsistent with the doctrine that the
courts of the demanding State possess jurisdiction to try the
fugitive only for the offence for which he was surrendered. It
is laid down as a general principle that where a court lacks
jurisdiction, consent of parties cannot confer it. This prin-
ciple, however, applies to the case where the defect in the
jurisdiction of the court is inherent. In the case we are dis-
cussing, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter
is conceded. The court is unable to proceed only because
the defendant is not within the jurisdiction. But if he volun-
tarily comes within the jurisdiction, if he submits himself by
his own action to the process of the court, its jurisdiction is
complete. The disability of the court is casual, not funda-
mental. Moreover, the principle that the fugitive may waive
his immunity has received the broadest and most general
recognition in the definition by courts and publicists of the
rule respecting the limitation as to trial. That rule, as stated
by Mr. Justice Miller in the case of Rauscher, is, "that a
person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the
court by virtue of proceeding under an extradition treaty, can
only be tried . . . for the offence with which he is
charged, in the proceedings for his extradition, until a reason-
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able time and opportunity have been given him, after his
release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country
from whose asylum he has been forcibly taken under those
proceedings." What is the basis of the right to try, after
such -time and opportunity" have been given? Nothing
else than the waiver by the accused of his immunity. By
refusing or neglecting to return, it is inferred that he has
waived his immunity and consented to be tried.
Since the system of extradition has found favor, not in
spite of the evils with which it was supposed to be identified,
but because experience has shown that they do not exist, it
may reasonably be anticipated that many of the restrictions
which now bear on the operation of the system will ere long
disappear before more rational views. It is greatly to be
desired that governments, while extending their conventional
relations on the subject, should each provide by law for the
surrender of criminals without reference to treaty obligations.
The theory that there must be an exact equivalence in the
exchange of criminals, as if they were valuable commodities,
was tolerable in the days when flight from justice was neither
so easy nor so frequent as at present, and crime did not so
often disclose the aspect of an international profession. But
that theory should now yield to the higher and more sensible
principle that it is neither the right nor the interest of any
nation to obstruct the administration of justice.
John Bassett Moore.
New York City.
